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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

prior to the joinder of issue, even in accounting proceedings. In
the action below, the surrogate, while recognizing that CPLR
3106(a) did not require joinder of issue, would not allow such an
examination in the accounting proceeding for fear that such liberality would lead to "fishing expeditions." However, the appellate
division did not think that such a reason was sufficient to deny
the pre-trial examination, especially in light of the safeguards
provided by CPLR 3103(a). 91

The rule of the Welsh case has recently been adopted in the
first department. In William V. Griffin & Co. v. Sperling S.S. &
Trading Corp.,92 the first department, citing the Welsh case, held
that pre-trial examination may proceed prior to the serving of an
answer without a showing of any special circumstances. The
decision in this case provides for liberal disclosure before trial, in
keeping with the intent of the CPLR.
ARTICLE 32-

AccEIRXATED JUDGMENT

CPLR 3216: Second department continues retroactive application
of amendnent.
Prior to the amendment of CPLR 3216, a defendant could
circumvent the 45-day notice required before moving to dismiss
for failure to prosecute by merely basing his motion on a "general
delay" rather than on a failure to file a note of issue. Under the
recent amendment, this loophole was eliminated, and the 45-day
a condition precedent to any motion
notice requirement is now
9
made under CPLR 3216. 3
While the effective date of the amendment was September 1,
1967, some courts have applied it to motions made prior to that
date. 4 In Kaprow v. Jacoby,95 the appellate division, second
department, held that a dismissal for "unreasonable neglect to proceed" dated October 5, 1966, where no 45-day notice was given
to the plaintiff, was an improvident exercise of the dismissing
OlIn order to avoid unreasonable annoyance or expense, etc., "[t]he
court may . . . make a protective order denying, limiting, conditioning or
regulating the use of any disclosure device." Under CPLR 3103(a) the
court can regulate such things as when the deposition can be taken; who
can be questioned; and what may or may not be inquired into. 3 WEINsTM, KORN & MILLER, Nmv YORK CIVIL PRACtiCE 113103.01 (1967).
9228 App. Div. 2d 976, 283 N.Y.S2d 449 (1st Dep't 1967).
93 For a thorough discussion of the purpose and effect of the amendment, see 7B McKINEy'S CPLR 3216, supp. commentary, 246 (1967) and
The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST. JoaNr's L. REv. 456-58
(1968).
947B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 246, 247 (1967).
928 App. Div. 2d 722, 281 N.Y.S.2d 591 (2d Dep't 1967).
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court's discretion. Thus, the court, without ever mentioning the
amendment, gave it retroactive effect. 96
The second department again employed retroactive application
of 3216, in the recent case of Terasaka v. Rehfield.97 There, the
amended section was applied to an order of the supreme court
dated prior to the statute's effective date. The court merely stated
that under the amended statute the defendant was obliged to give
the 45-day notice as a condition precedent to the motion for dismissal.
Thus, while not expressly stating it, the second department
continues to apply the amended section retroactively. The first
department, however, has yet to follow 9 this course and has given
strong indication that it will not do so.

8

CPLR 3216: Action against attorney for mlpractice after
dismissal for failure to prosecute.
It has been said that "the primary source of the lawyer's fear
of 3216" is that, after a dismissal for failure to prosecute, he will
be the object of a new action for malpractice. 9 In Gladden v.
Logan,100 this situation developed. The court found the defendants
guilty, but further suggested, however, that the plaintiff could not
recover for the malpractice unless she could show that she would
have recovered in the action that had been dismissed pursuant to
CPLR 3216.
It was early established that when one seeks to hold an attorney liable for neglect in the prosecution of litigation he must prove
both negligence and that he would have been successful in the
original action.' 0 ' This rule has been consistently followed in
cases stemming from a dismissal for failure to prosecute. 02
While the attorney is thus clothed with an ostensible safeguard,
he should, however, take care to notify his client if he does not
feel the suit should be prosecuted, for although he may be safe
from a malpractice action where his client had little hope of success
96 For a discussion of this case, see The Quarterly Survey of New York
Practice, 42 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 456 (1968).
9728 App. Div. 2d 1011, 284 N.Y.S.2d 168 (2d Dep't 1967).
9See Leonard v. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, 28 App. Div. 2d 844,
281 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1st Dep't 1967). This case involved another portion
of the amended statute. See The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice,
42 Sr. JoHN's L. REv. 456, 457-58 (1968).
99 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 246, 254 (1967).
10028 App. Div. 2d 1116, 284 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1st Dep't 1967).
01o
See McAllenan v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 232 N.Y. 199, 133 N.E.
444 (1921); Vooth v. McEachen, 181 N.Y. 28, 73 N.E. 488 (1905).
102See, e.g., Hamilton v. Dannenberg, 239 App. Div. 155, 267 N.Y.S.
156 (1st Dep't 1933); Gross v. Eannace, 44 Misc. 2d 797, 255 N.Y.S.2d
625 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1964).

